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Questions and Answers
Linda Rusch, Moderator, Hamline University: Now, I can only
believe that so many people are still here at 4:30 in the afternoon
because they want to get to the microphone and ask questions or
make comments. So we have now come to that portion of the
program-you've heard what our panelists have to say-where I
invite you to participate.
John Oakley, University of California at Davis: My bias, I guess,
is that I'm a Reporter for an ALI statutory project, so I've been
fascinated by the description of the concerns over the functionality of
processes of private legislation. I took the microphone because a key
point that was raised early on and touched upon in several
subsequent discussions and presentations was: Just what happened in
July of 1999 when the agenda was changed? And Professor Miller
talked about the general processes of decision-making, but didn't
touch upon what happened in terms of withdrawing discussion of a
draft that was before the body, and I wondered if he would elaborate
his view of both the facts of the matter and what role whatever
process was used plays-should play-in our overall consideration of
the functionality of the process.
Linda Rusch: Thank you. Fred?
Fred Miller: I am glad you raised that question, because I really
wanted to address that. I have tried to stay away from responding to
counter-charges and charges because I don't think that's very
productive. But since you raised the question, that gives me an
opportunity to do so. I think that this has been an interesting
discussion-it may even be useful-but it certainly is very important
to remember what Dick Speidel said, and that is that he was giving
you his impression. Also, Professor Cohen gave you his impression of
what occurred. Let me tell you what did, in fact, occur.
Richard Speidel: Or your impression of it at least.
Fred Miller: Well, I have a colleague back in Oklahoma who was
a legislator for many years and when he would come before a court,
he would always make the argument, "what I am telling you, Court, is
the right answer because I was there and created it," so if you want to
take it with a grain, okay. Essentially, the National Conference
agenda in that particular year had a lot of things on it. There were
acts up for a first reading, other than Article 2 and others, and there
were acts for a final reading other than Article 2 and others. And,
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essentially, we try to allocate a certain amount of time on our best
judgment for each act and at that point we had thought that the
debate on Article 2 would likely take "x" amount of time and we had
allocated the rest of the agenda accordingly.
It was apparent by the end of the morning that the debate on
Article 2, if left to run, would take a great deal more, and it would
push other things off the agenda where promises had been made.
And so under those circumstances, the thought was that since it was
unlikely we were seeing a consensus anyhow, the end result would be
to take 2 off the agenda and think about whether we ought to
reconstitute and come back another year or not, and that's what we
did. Now, that was in the prerogative of the President. He arranges
the agenda. Somebody has to control it. That was his judgment
based on advice from a number of different people. Now Neil also
alluded to the juxtaposition of the decision on UCITA as well as on
Article 2, because UCrTA did take a lot of time, and it was allowed to
continue.
The reason there was that the judgment call on UCITA was that
there was nothing more that could be done in the drafting process to
reach consensus. The only way that could possibly produce consensus
was to send it out and have the debate in the legislatures. And that is,
in effect, what's occurring. There has been amendment in Maryland,
there has been amendment in Virginia, there are amendments going
on, possibly, to satisfy other groups. And it's because of the
legislative process putting the pressure on.
UCITA was taken out of the Code because we could see that
that was coming. If we had left it as 2B, you would end up with, if you
will, an enactment record on the UCC that would be compromised.
By taking it out and putting it out as a Uniform Act, you can tolerate
more of that kind of debate. So that was the decision that was made
with respect to Article 2 and the reasons for it.
Linda Rusch: Does anybody on the panel or in the audience
want to say anything on that issue? Boy, we are certainly a polite
group.
Randy Barnett, Boston University: Actually, I have to tell you, I
haven't heard so much discussion of right answers since I was a
student in Ronald Dworkin's Jurisprudence class many years ago. I
thought that went out of fashion in some circles, but I can see it is still
in fashion in other circles I was unaware of.
I consider myself to be quite an outsider to this process. I am not
all that familiar with how the process of making uniform laws
operates, so the description of how the procedure worked was
illuminating to me. But I also heard something that I hadn't really
expected given my outsider status here, and that is a dichotomy of
rhetoric. On the one hand, we had the good guys: the buyers, the
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consumers. While on the other hand we had bullies, lobbyists, dark
outside forces, which were referring, it seems to me from my little
knowledge of this to be sellers. When I teach Contracts, half the
transacting parties are sellers, the other half are buyers, and I hadn't
assumed that one side was necessarily the good side, the good guys,
and the other side was necessarily the bad guys.
Now I realize this is in the aftermath of a very draining and
emotional experience for the drafters and the Committee, so I guess
one has to make allowances for that. But the tenor of the comments
I've heard from all the members of the panel who were actually
involved in the process-unlike Bob Scott who's the one member of
the panel who was not involved in the process-makes me wonder
how balanced and fair the process actually was. Just sitting here
listening, if you were a court and I were a lawyer representing a
bullying, lobbyist, outsider, "strong seller," would I feel like I would
get a fair trial from this court? Or would I want a change of venue in
order to have my case heard?
So maybe I need to hear more about the process to know why it
is that these sellers are so repulsive that they are to be discussed this
way in these terms. I mean I realize they successfully, apparently,
delayed the implementation of Article 2 and that's a reason to hate
them, but they may have had some reasons for doing this. I'm
wondering what confidence those of us who are outsiders should have
in the process of decision-making that's been described here.
And I should also add that it struck me that there are no sellers
on this panel. I mean, I suppose that maybe they were invited.
Maybe lawyers representing the evil sellers who actually were
powerful enough in some way to block Article 2, and I don't even
know how that power was exercised-that hasn't been described
today-maybe they were invited to participate on this panel to give
their view of how they thought the process turned out and they just
couldn't make it. But it seems to me that if that if that wasn't the
case, and they actually weren't invited to Participate here that maybe
this also says something about the fairness and balance of the overall
process and the kind of outcome we could expect from it. So anyway,
thank you.
Linda Rusch: Henry.
Henry Gabriel: Randy, did you want a response?
Randy Barnett: I don't know, was it necessary to put that in the
form of a question? Are we playing Jeopardy? The question is-
reassure me, I'd like to know more about the process, that suggests
that it is fairer than this panel suggests to me that it is.
Henry Gabriel: I think it is fair and I can tell you who the good
guys and bad guys are. The short answer is the bad guys are anybody
that disagrees with the Drafting Committee. No, I'm joking. In fact,
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to the degree that you heard today, people who came here who are
lobbyists or have a particular persuasion, then the world is good and
bad, depending on it. But I think that the Drafting Committee has
never seen people as good or bad: they seem them as difficult, right?
Difficult because things have to get done. But the process, as I've
seen it, has been just an interminable attempt to be balanced and to
listen to both sides. In most, no I won't say most, in many situations,
people who are there advocating for whatever their position is, and
positions from everywhere, would make intelligent comments that
would add tremendously to the dialogue. And I think that to the
degree that an impression has been given that there is this world of
good and bad guys, from my perspective, down in the trenches as the
Reporter, I don't think there really are good or bad guys. I just think
there are a lot of competing values out there in the process trying to
balance it. And Gail's going to tell you who the bad guys are.
Robert Scott: Randy, there aren't good guys and bad guys, but
there are big guys and little guys.
Henry Gabriel: But, Bob, we know the difference and we take, I
think we take it into consideration.
Robert Scott: I'm not saying you don't. I'm just saying that
that's a positive statement of fact.
Gail Hiiebrand: I need to add. I'm a registered lobbyist, I'm
proud of it. But, we came into this process for a very specific
purpose: to advance the views that we believe would help consumers
in this process. That's my job, that's what I did. In the Article 2
process, the sellers came in and advanced the views they thought
would help their clients. There's nothing wrong with that, on either
side. The Article 2 process went wrong in my view, because the
Conference leadership was afraid to say to those sellers, "we're going
to stand behind our Drafting Committee and we're going to try to
enact what our Drafting Committee has put forward." They backed
up too early in the negotiation process, if you will. Now, obviously,
there will be disagreement about that. But, I don't think the process
went wrong because the sellers advocated what they believe was the
best law for their clients; the process went wrong because the
Conference was afraid to stand up to the sellers in a context where
their Drafting Committee, after repeated votes, and the Executive
Committee in 1996 said, "we disagree."
Linda Rusch: Anybody else on the panel?
Neil Cohen: One last thing. I think that the composition not so
much of the Drafting Committee but of the drafting group, including
the observers, was in fact much more evenly balanced than this panel.
This is a law professors panel. For these purposes Gail is an honorary
law professor. She's certainly taught me a lot over the years, and
drafting committees, UCC drafting committees, are like law professor
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heaven. You get to sit around for four, five, six, twelve years in
Dick's case, and debate about what the answer ought to be. And you
sit around, you debate and you debate and you debate and sometimes
you write an article about the debate explaining why of course you're
right, and some decisions are made. And we sort of like the decisions
we make, and, as someone pointed out, law professors tend to be the
majority on many of these committees, but "law professor" comes
from the Greek word for "naYve."
And in fact there's a lot of that going on here because I think
that, what I'll somewhat neutrally call the powerful interest groups,
they weren't naYve. They knew that the Drafting Committees and the
National Conference and the ALI, in a sense, were an exercise. A
very important exercise, but an exercise. The law isn't made by these
non-legal organizations, non-legislative organizations. Law is in fact
made by legislators. And I think a number of us have fallen prey to
this feeling that "well that's not fair, they lost in our process and they
went over our heads."
And at one level, it's not fair. At another level, it's their right.
No one told them they had to sign on to this process where whatever
came out of this process they had to live by if they could convince a
legislature to do something else. And while we may not like the fact
that there are other organs that have power, not law professors, I
think that we somehow at least have to accept that reality. But as a
law professor-dominated panel, I think sometimes we have trouble
swallowing it, at least swallowing it and smiling at the same time.
Richard Speidel: If I could make one comment. Professor
Barnett has raised I think an important question, and that has to do
with the so-called strong sellers that I assert didn't capture the
process, they blocked it. And they blocked it because they were
content with the way Article 2 is now structured, because it gives
them a variety of advantages in making deals with consumers and
others. But that's a legitimate position if you accept that the power to
block is part of the democracy that Neil was talking about.
The thing that bothered us, Randy, was that Linda and I took a
whole year between 1996 and 97; NCCUSL put us on hold after the
1996 draft, apparently because they thought the Drafting Committee
had gotten out of control and was trying to get too much consumer
protection in there. There was constant reaction adverse to it. I've
got all the files and documents. I've got a whole office full of stuff.
Linda and I spent a whole year going through every letter, every
brief, every memo from all of the sellers, analyzing the issues that we
thought they were objecting to, trying to get the Drafting Committee
to respond to them, setting up positions for negotiation so we could
go to them, basically, and say "we see your point here, let's adjust
that, let's work that."
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We made probably fifty or sixty changes in that two-year period,
trying to get a draft that could be worked out and approved. And
what we got essentially was "guess again." We'd send memos; people
would negotiate. The bottom line never was stated. The folks who
opposed it never told us, at least, they may have told Fred, what it
would take to get approval of that draft. And the result is that you
could see, over the course of four or five years, this sort of opposition
that was developing, that was reinforced by, I think, the software
producers that "let's take the position that to the extent that there are
more improvements for buyers in this Article 2 draft, we're not going
to buy them."
Now that goes back to Dean Scott's comments about whether
this is the place for consumer protection. I've always worried about
that. All I can say about Dean Scott is if he considers me a mentor,
I'm very proud of the product that's been produced there.
Norm Silber, Hofstra Law School: I've been involved in this
process in a number of places, usually from a consumer point of view.
But the question that I want to ask about is enactability. And I
certainly understand that enactability is an important consideration
for NCCUSL, but I wonder if we could pay some more attention to
both the timing of enactability decisions and also the locus for that
decision, and how much deference might be due to Reporters and
members of the Drafting Committee, at least considering that they
themselves think about enactability at the time that they make those
decisions.
In the case of Article 2, I guess the question that occurs to me is
does one, if I were to get involved in a project such as this, could I
wait another four, five, six years and then at 11:58 (two minutes
before midnight) have an enactability decision or criterion applied
which would then lead the Executive Committee and not the
Committee as a whole to withdraw another draft? And I understood
Professor Miller, Fred, I understood you to say that it may be that
there are more of these situations in the future. And it would seem to
me that that's terribly corrosive of the willingness of anybody to
participate in the drafting process, if they think that you can go
through these things for a long period of time only to have them
withdrawn.
Linda Rusch: Anybody on the panel care to respond?
Fred Miller: I think it's very difficult to assess this Article 2
experience. There are many, many factors that are involved and I
don't think at this hour that we could do justice to talking about it.
But what we are doing in terms of what I said in the context of the
Executive Committee is, I think, taking a harder look. Enactability is
important. As some people have said, you can write a law review
article or you can write a statute.
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And I think Neil put his finger on it. He is talking about
democracy. We don't have one right answer. There are a selection of
possible right answers. There may be some better than others, but
opinions can differ. And so the bottom line is, very often we find that
when we have a study committee, for example, we have very few
study committees that come in and say, "It's not worth doing." They
get a life of their own. The same thing happens with a drafting
committee, and quite frankly, that happened in spades with the
Article 2 Drafting Committee. And I think it is possible that one has
to stand back a little bit and take a more objective assessment.
And in that sense, we're learning from our sister organization,
because, quite frankly, I was personally very upset when the council
elected not to put UCITA in front of the membership. I do not
believe that their view of UCITA was my view of UCITA. But as a
member of the ALI I could not debate it because it didn't go to floor.
I think there is some virtue in that, and as I said, I think it adds a little
objective content to it. The Executive Committee does have
considerations to look at in addition to the fact of the substance of it,
and so that may be a little less democratic, but on the other hand, it
also may avoid some of these problems in the future. We have to find
a way to work this out together. If we don't, this process will fail.
And I don't think personally, it's a good thing if it does fail. I think
the alternatives are worse.
Linda Rusch: Anybody else? Now we have a line at the
microphone.
Jay Feinman, Rutgers University: I'm particularly intrigued by
the first half of Bob Scott's analysis, but the part that puzzles me
about it, is when you talk about large "P" politics, you talk about
structural features of the uniform law process. When I think of large
"" politics, particularly comparing the institutional competence of
uniform law drafting institutions with legislatures and courts, I try to
think about what else is going on at the time. And, Dick's smart
sellers-such as GE-are the perfect example. What else is GE doing
at this moment when they're engaged in the Article 2 drafting
process? Well, they're going to the State legislatures and in state
after state, along with others, they're successful in enacting tort
reform statutes. Back to the ALI, they're attempting to influence the
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability to repeal most of the
developments of the 1960s and 1970s. They are enacting and
attempting to enact, both in the State Legislatures and the Congress,
and by Federal Executive Order, various efforts to make it difficult
for Government to regulate, for example, land use. They're raising
ninety million dollars which transforms George W. Bush from relative
unknown to President of the United States in a relatively short period
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of time. So I think there is this larger dimension of the politics, rather
than just the structure of the uniform process that is involved here.
Robert Scott: My only comment, Jay, would be that, my
argument is not based on a normative preference for one set of
outcomes over the other, but that the uniform laws process will tend
to bias ways in which the rules are made in a way that's not
necessarily consistent with, whatever it is, the structure of the rules
themselves. If your priors are that you want a certain outcome and
then you step back and say "how can I best achieve that outcome," it
may very well be that you would prefer to champion the uniform laws
process because in fact it is preferable to ordinary legislative process
in terms of reaching the normative outcomes that you want. I was
being agnostic on normative outcomes with respect to the uniform
law process, merely saying that it skewed the legislative products
more systematically than the ordinary legislative process would, but
not necessarily in any normative way.
Deborah Hellman, University of Maryland: I was puzzled by
Neil Cohen's comments that seemed to argue that a commitment to
democracy requires that enactability. This seems a fairly attenuated
sense of democracy to me. And given Dean Scott's criticism of the
process in general-particularly the idea that value choices are
certainly in play in whatever legislation is drafted-I'd like to hear
more from those who believe that enactability is important. Other
than the desire to maintain the power of the organization, what kind
of normative argument is there for inevitability?
Neil Cohen: I guess that depends on how you define democracy.
And I guess I'm thinking of a negative component-I don't mean
normatively negative-as well as a positive component. Democracy
is what the system will produce through the democratic process and
what the system won't produce through the democratic process.
There are collections of wonderful books of unbuilt architecture,
buildings that were designed that are never built because the market
didn't support them or some other reason, and if we produce a
wonderful draft statute that the political process, for good or for evil,
will not enact, that is a result of democracy. It may not be one that I
endorse, it may not be one that I agree with, but it doesn't mean it
doesn't happen.
And I think that in the process we can sometimes decide to be
silent, because promulgating something that can survive
democratically and can get enacted isn't something we'd want to
associate our names with and so we'd rather be silent than to
promulgate something just because its enactable. There are other
times where we might choose to pick from among rules that are
equally right except for the one that's normatively "right-er" because
I agree with it. We might choose to pick from among the right rules
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one that is enactable because we want a rule. I don't think democracy
is a synonym for all things true and beautiful. It's a synonym for, in a
sense, what the political process will produce or will fail to produce.
Deborah Hellman: But a prediction about what it will produce is
not the same thing as what it will produce.
Neil Cohen: Absolutely. The predictions may well be wrong and
I profess zero expertise on making those predictions, which is why I
don't care to challenge the Conference leadership's prediction
because they've got more experience than I do.
Linda Rusch: Jean?
Jean Braucher, University of Arizona: I wanted to make a quick
comment, and then I have a question for Bob Scott. The comment, I
guess, goes to an issue that a number of people have referred to which
is federal versus state. I think its absolutely clear that when you're
talking about consumer rules, the federal process does better and
Henry used the example of UETA and E-sign. With E-sign you got a
set of bright-line consumer rules in the last Congress. And it was
through the National Consumer Law Center which came in and got
two senators involved in the process, and we got some consumer
rules. Now they might not be the ones I would have chosen. I don't
think they're perfect, but they were part of the package.
But the other point I wanted to make, or question really, for Bob
Scott is, I guess, I want to try to make a defense of "mush." And,
because you said getting it right in the commercial world, and I'm not
talking about consumer rules now, but for the commercial world,
would involve having an Article 2 that involved certainty and
predictability. And I think, since this is a Contracts Session, that that
comment struck me as a sort of a relational view of the world, that
you have this idea that you could write a contract document up front
and that you could predict everything. And the advantage of our
current Article 2 is that it, at least in certain interpretations of it,
right, with a sort of broad parol evidence rule and that sort of thing, is
that it looks to the adjustment of relations over time. I, for one, don't
buy the Lisa Bernstein analysis; I think what it does is it rewards
strategic behavior at the expense of those who cooperatively adjust
arrangements. And when she comes up with these categories of
relationship-preserving norms, that those shouldn't be honored by the
courts. Instead we should go to so-called "endgame norms." That
assumes that everybody's thinking that way, and trying to predict and
write into the contract at the outset very detailed rules.
Robert Scott: Very fair question, Jean. I guess I do share,
although I don't buy Lisa Bernstein's particular analysis, but I do
share a starting point that she has. I actually think, to be
embarrassed, I started with it first, which is why I share it. About
thirteen years ago I wrote an article on conflict and cooperation in
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long term contracts, and the point I tried to make was that patterns of
cooperation develop even in the absence of legal regimes. And I still
think that that's true, and so I've long thought that there was, you
know, Ellickson said "beware of the myth of legal centrism," that
there are powerful normative forces in relational contracts and that
they regulate a great deal of the relationship-McCaulay told us this
a quarter of a century or more ago-and that therefore legal default
rules serve a minor but very important purpose as kind of a nuclear
umbrella. And from that perspective, I don't find it arelational. Now
I think Dick would disagree with me and would agree with you, and I
think he has said that I am no longer arelationist now that I've gone
this down this path and maybe I'll turn around, maybe I'll decide I
was completely wrong. Who knows? But my sense of it is that
there's a difference between Contract as an institution, which is
synthetic and relational, and Contract Law which is simple, formal,
classical-not neo-classical or relational in that sense at all. And that
it may not be such a bad thing that we have two sets of rules. We
have a set of rules for umbrella legal enforcement, and then a set of
informal social norms that are better if not judicialized. But, anyway,
that's where I was coming from.
Gail Hillebrand: Jean, I'd like to comment on the assumption
that you make that you get a better or stronger consumer protection
rule from Congress than from a State Legislature. It has been my
experience that you often can get a strong consumer protection from
Congress only after a State has acted and quite often only after a
State has acted non-uniformly. It's the fact that there is a state rule
out there and that other States are considering different variations of
that same state rule that creates the leverage and the environment in
which the industry doesn't just say, "no new protections for
consumers," in fact they have to play and have to talk about what
those should be. And the commitment shown by the author of the
California ETA, Senator Byron Sher, to do the right thing and to put
significant non-uniformity into the California ETA was a tremendous
spur to Congress looking at consumers-they couldn't say "Oh, those
consumers are out to lunch." They had to say, "How can a
legislature, by a large margin, have thought these protections were
more important? We don't want these protections, but we have to
have some protections. What should they be?"
Jean Braucher: I agree. I was talking about the state uniform
laws process, that you get a better result out of Congress than out of
the uniform process for consumer rules.
Henry Gabriel: Jean, my point on that was that you're going to
get a technically better drafted statute.
Spencer Neff, Case Western Reserve: What troubles me about
explaining what happened with Article 2 on the basis that it couldn't
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be enacted is, number one, the Executive Committee as I understand
it made a decision on what they thought was politically acceptable,
and what they thought was that if General Electric and General
Motors and these people are against you, it doesn't matter how many
voters you have in favor of you. Because the Legislatures in the
states are going to respond to the big money and not respond in any
kind of a democratically responsive way. And, it seems to me, that's
wrong. As an empirical matter, and also wrong as a way of the
responsibility that NCCUSL has.
Linda Rusch: I want to thank the panelists for all of your
interesting and provocative ideas.

